Metaphysics of Mind — Five-Mark Model Answers
Paper 2 — 55 five-mark questions across 9 topics
Fundamental Concepts
1 questions
Explain the following two features of mental states: phenomenal properties and intentional properties. [5]
Substance Dualism
7 questions
Explain substance dualism. [5]
Explain the indivisibility argument for substance dualism. [5]
Explain the response to the indivisibility argument that the mental is divisible in some sense. [5]
Explain the response to the indivisibility argument that not everything thought of as physical is divisible. [5]
Explain the conceivability argument for substance dualism. [5]
Explain the response to the conceivability argument that the mind without the body is not conceivable. [5]
Explain the response to the conceivability argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. [5]
Property Dualism
9 questions
Explain the response to the conceivability argument that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. [5]
Explain property dualism. [5]
Explain the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument for property dualism (David Chalmers). [5]
Explain the response to the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument that a ‘philosophical zombie’ / a ‘zombie’ world is not conceivable. [5]
Explain the response to the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument that what is conceivable may not be metaphysically possible. [5]
Explain the response to the ‘philosophical zombies’ argument that what is metaphysically possible tells us nothing about the actual world. [5]
Explain the ‘knowledge / Mary’ argument for property dualism (Frank Jackson). [5]
Explain the response to the ‘knowledge / Mary’ argument that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain ability knowledge (the ‘ability knowledge’ response). [5]
Explain the response to the ‘knowledge / Mary’ argument that Mary does not gain new propositional knowledge but does gain acquaintance knowledge (the ‘acquaintance knowledge’ response). [5]
Physicalism: Behaviourism
9 questions
Explain how natural selection / evolution poses a challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism. [5]
Explain physicalism about the mind. [5]
Explain ‘hard’ philosophical behaviourism (Carl Hempel). [5]
Explain ‘soft’ philosophical behaviourism (Gilbert Ryle). [5]
Explain how the knowledge/Mary argument could be used to attack philosophical behaviourism. [5]
Explain how the philosophical zombies argument could be used to attack philosophical behaviourism. [5]
Explain how the distinctness of mental states from behaviour (including Hilary Putnam’s ‘Super-Spartans’ and perfect actors) is an issue for philosophical behaviourism. [5]
Explain how defining mental states satisfactorily due to circularity is an issue for philosophical behaviourism. [5]
Explain how defining mental states satisfactorily due to the multiple realisability of mental states in behaviour is an issue for philosophical behaviourism. [5]
Physicalism: Mind-Brain Identity
6 questions
Explain how the asymmetry between self-knowledge and knowledge of other people’s mental states is an issue for philosophical behaviourism. [5]
Explain mind-brain type identity theory. [5]
Explain how the indivisibility argument could be used to criticise mind-brain type identity theory. [5]
Explain how the conceivability argument could be used to criticise mind-brain type identity theory. [5]
Explain how the knowledge/Mary argument could be used to criticise mind-brain type identity theory. [5]
Explain how the philosophical zombies argument could be used to criticise mind-brain type identity theory. [5]
Physicalism: Eliminative Materialism
4 questions
Explain how providing the type identities (the multiple realisability of mental states) is an issue for mind-brain type identity theory. [5]
Explain eliminative materialism. [5]
Explain how our certainty about the existence of mental states is an issue for eliminative materialism. [5]
Explain how the fact that folk-psychology has good predictive and explanatory power (and so is the best hypothesis) is an issue for eliminative materialism. [5]
Functionalism
4 questions
Explain how eliminative materialism can be criticised for being self-refuting. [5]
Explain functionalism about the mind. [5]
Explain how the possibility of a functional duplicate with different qualia (inverted qualia) is an issue for functionalism. [5]
Explain how the possibility of a functional duplicate with no mentality / qualia (Ned Block’s China thought experiment) is an issue for functionalism. [5]
Issues for Dualism
9 questions
Explain the response to the ‘knowledge / Mary’ argument that Mary does gain new propositional knowledge but this is knowledge of physical facts that she already knew in a different way (the ‘New Knowledge / Old Fact’ response). [5]
Explain how the problem of other minds is an issue for dualism. [5]
Explain how the argument from analogy might be used to respond to the problem of other minds. [5]
Explain how the idea that the existence of other minds is the best hypothesis might be used to respond to the problem of other minds. [5]
Explain how dualism might be criticised for making a ‘category mistake’ (Gilbert Ryle). [5]
Explain how the conceptual interaction problem (Elizabeth, Princess of Bohemia) might be an issue for interactionist dualism. [5]
Explain how the empirical interaction problem might be an issue for interactionist dualism. [5]
Explain how introspective self-knowledge poses a challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism. [5]
Explain how the phenomenology of our mental life (ie as involving causal connections, both psychological and psycho-physical) poses a challenge to epiphenomenalist dualism. [5]
Similarities & Differences
6 questions
Explain how the idea that the ‘knowledge / Mary’ argument can be applied to functional facts (no amount of facts about function suffices to explain qualia) is an issue for functionalism. [5]
Explain one difference and one similarity between interactionist and epiphenomenalist dualism [5] (2025)
Explain how the claims made by eliminative materialism and mind brain identity theory differ. [5] (2020)
Explain how the claims made by substance dualism and property dualism differ.[5] (2023)
Explain one difference and one similarity between philosophical behaviourism and functionalism. [5]
Explain one difference and one similarity between philosophical behaviourism and mind-brain type identity theory. [5]
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