Metaphysics of Mind — Key Terms and Definitions
Core Concepts
- Qualia
- The subjective, experiential qualities of conscious experience — the 'what it is like' aspect of mental states. For example, the redness of seeing red, or the painfulness of pain. Qualia are private, introspectively accessible, and central to debates about physicalism.
- Intentionality
- The property of mental states by which they are directed at or about something. Beliefs are about something, desires are for something, fears are of something. Intentionality is the 'aboutness' or representational content of mental states.
- Phenomenal consciousness
- The aspect of consciousness concerned with subjective experience — the 'what it is like' to have a particular experience. There is something it is like to see red or taste coffee. The 'hard problem' of consciousness is explaining why physical processes give rise to phenomenal experience.
Dualism
- Substance dualism
- The view, associated with Descartes, that the mind and body are two distinct substances. The mind is a non-physical thinking substance; the body is a physical extended substance. They are fundamentally different kinds of thing that interact causally.
- Property dualism
- The view that there is only one kind of substance (physical), but it has two fundamentally different kinds of property: physical properties (such as mass and charge) and non-physical mental properties (such as consciousness and qualia).
- Interactionism
- The dualist view that mind and body causally interact in both directions. Mental events cause physical events (e.g. deciding to raise your arm causes your arm to rise) and physical events cause mental events (e.g. stubbing your toe causes pain).
- Epiphenomenalism
- The view that physical events cause mental events, but mental events have no causal power over the physical world. Consciousness is a by-product of brain activity — like steam from a locomotive — that does not causally affect anything.
- Conceivability argument
- Descartes' argument for substance dualism: I can clearly and distinctly conceive of my mind existing without my body, and my body without my mind. What is conceivable is possible. Therefore mind and body are distinct substances that can exist apart.
- Indivisibility argument
- Descartes' argument: the body has spatial parts and can be divided (e.g. losing a limb), but the mind has no spatial parts and cannot be divided. Since the mind and body differ in this fundamental property, by Leibniz's Law they must be distinct substances.
- Philosophical zombie
- A thought experiment: a being that is physically and functionally identical to a conscious human in every respect, but has no phenomenal consciousness — no qualia, no subjective experience. If zombies are conceivable, physicalism may be false. Associated with Chalmers.
- Knowledge argument (Mary's Room)
- Jackson's argument: Mary is a scientist who knows all physical facts about colour vision but has lived in a black-and-white room. When she sees red for the first time, she learns something new — what it is like to see red. Therefore there are non-physical facts, and physicalism is false.
- Problem of other minds
- The epistemological challenge of how we can know that other people have minds or conscious experiences. We can observe others' behaviour and brain states, but we cannot directly access their subjective experience. Each person has direct access only to their own mind.
- Argument from analogy (other minds)
- An argument for the existence of other minds: other people behave similarly to me in similar circumstances; I have mental states that cause my behaviour; so probably they have mental states too. Criticised because it generalises from a single case (my own mind).
Physicalism
- Physicalism / materialism
- The view that everything that exists is physical, or depends entirely on the physical. There are no non-physical minds, souls, or properties. All mental states are ultimately physical states of the brain or body.
- Mind-brain type identity theory
- The physicalist view that each type of mental state is identical to a type of brain state. For example, pain is identical to C-fibre firing — they are the same thing described in two different ways, just as water is identical to H₂O.
- Multiple realisability
- The objection that the same mental state (e.g. pain) can be realised by different physical states in different organisms. Octopuses feel pain but have very different brains from humans. This challenges type identity theory, since pain cannot be identical to one specific brain state.
- Hard behaviourism (logical behaviourism)
- The view, associated with Hempel, that all statements about mental states can be translated without loss of meaning into statements about observable physical behaviour. 'She is in pain' means nothing more than 'she is exhibiting pain behaviour'.
- Soft behaviourism (analytical behaviourism)
- Ryle's view that mental states are not inner events but dispositions to behave in certain ways. To say someone believes it is raining is to say they are disposed to carry an umbrella, wear a coat, etc. The mind is not a 'ghost in the machine'.
- Category mistake
- Ryle's concept: the error of treating something as if it belongs to one logical category when it actually belongs to another. Treating the mind as a 'thing' inside the body is a category mistake — like a visitor who sees all the colleges and libraries and asks 'but where is the university?'
- Eliminative materialism
- The view that our common-sense 'folk psychology' — the framework of beliefs, desires, and intentions we use to explain behaviour — is a fundamentally flawed theory that will eventually be replaced by neuroscience. There are no beliefs or desires, just brain states.
- Folk psychology
- The common-sense framework of beliefs, desires, intentions, and other mental states that we use in everyday life to explain and predict behaviour. Eliminative materialists argue folk psychology is a false theory that will be replaced by neuroscience.
- Supervenience
- A relation between two sets of properties: mental properties supervene on physical properties if there can be no change in the mental without a corresponding change in the physical. Two beings that are physically identical must also be mentally identical.
- Causal closure of the physical
- The principle that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. There is no need to invoke non-physical causes to explain physical events. This is a challenge to interactionist dualism, which claims non-physical mental events cause physical events.
Functionalism
- Functionalism
- The view that mental states are defined by their functional roles — their causal relations to sensory inputs, behavioural outputs, and other mental states. What makes something pain is not what it is made of but what it does. Mental states can be multiply realised.
- Functional role
- The causal role a mental state plays in the overall cognitive system: what causes it (inputs), what it causes (outputs and other mental states). For example, pain is caused by tissue damage, causes distress and avoidance behaviour, and interacts with beliefs and desires.
- Inverted qualia
- A thought experiment against functionalism: two people could be functionally identical — same inputs, outputs, and internal relations — but have systematically different qualia. My experience of red could be your experience of green. If so, functionalism misses something about the mind.
- Indiscernibility of identicals (Leibniz's Law)
- The principle that if A and B are identical (the very same thing), they must share all the same properties. If they differ in even one property, they are not identical. Used to argue for and against various theories of mind — e.g. if mental states have properties that brain states lack, they are not identical.
Practice All Terms
27 terms across 4 topics — smart order
27 terms across 4 topics
Tap any term to reveal its definition — use Practice mode for active recall