Is Behaviourism a Convincing Theory of Mind?
I will conclude that behaviourism is not convincing. While its focus on empirical verification provides a useful tool for linguistic clarification, it fails to account for the privacy of introspection and cannot complete its own reduction without falling into circularity
- Behaviourism argues that talk about the mind is really just talk about behavior. Hard behaviourists (like Carl Hempel) argue for an analytic reduction: mental terms mean the same as behavioral descriptions. Soft behaviourists (like Gilbert Ryle) argue that mental states are dispositions to behave in certain ways under certain conditions - The theory's strength lies in its attempt to solve the 'Problem of Other Minds' by making the mental publicly observable and verifiable - I will evaluate behaviourism against the 'Super Spartan' objection, the 'Asymmetry' of self-knowledge, and the fatal issue of 'Circularity'. I will conclude that the theory is not convincing
Section 1: Hard vs. Soft Behaviourism and the Super Spartans
- Ryle's soft behaviourism is a significant improvement over Hempel's rigid verificationism; by using 'dispositions', Ryle can explain why an actor 'acting' in pain isn't really in pain (they lack the underlying disposition to scream if unobserved) - However, Putnam's Super Spartans (and Super-Super Spartans) break even Ryle’s account. If a culture creates people who never show pain under any condition, they lack even the *disposition* to scream, yet they still feel pain. This proves that mental states are distinct from behavioral patterns
Carl Hempel / Gilbert Ryle: Behavioral Analytic Reduction
- Hempel (Hard) argues that 'Tom is in pain' is just a shorthand for a set of physical observations (screaming, wincing). Ryle (Soft) argues it's a disposition: Tom is *inclined* to scream, even if he doesn't right now - This avoids 'Descartes' Myth' produced by the 'Ghost in the Machine'—the idea that the mind is a mysterious substance behind the behavior. Instead, the mind *is* the pattern of behavior
Section 2: The Asymmetry of Self-Knowledge
- Ryle's response (that we just observe ourselves 'more often') is demonstrably insufficient. Even if someone observed you 24/7, they would still lack the direct 'feeling' of your thoughts that you possess - This 'Asymmetry' proves that there is a private method of knowledge (introspection) that behaviourism cannot explain. This unique access suggests that the mind has a private, non-behavioral dimension
: The Asymmetry Objection
- This objection notes that there's a difference between how I know *your* mind and how I know *my* mind. I know yours by observing your body; I know mine by 'just knowing' (introspection) - If behaviourism were true, I would have to observe my own behavior to know I'm happy (e.g., 'I see I am laughing, therefore I must be happy'). Since this is absurd, behaviourism must be wrong about how mental states are known
Section 3: The Circularity and Multiple Realisability Issues
- The 'Circularity' issue is particularly fatal because it reveals that behaviourism is not actually a reduction to the physical at all—it's just a shuffle of mental labels - The 'Multiple Realisability' issue shows that you can't even list the behaviors. Fear might lead to hiding, fighting, or laughing hysterically depending on the person. This infinite variety means 'Fear' cannot be a singular behavioral term
: The Circularity Objection
- To define a belief behaviorally, you must assume other mental states. For example, 'Believing it's raining' reduces to 'carrying an umbrella' ONLY IF you assume the person 'desires to stay dry' - If the definition of a mental state (belief) includes another mental state (desire), then the reduction is circular. You have failed to replace 'mind' with 'behavior'; you have simply defined one mental state in terms of another
- Behaviourism fails as a complete account of the mind because it cannot explain away the subjective 'insideness' of experience. Putnam's Super Spartans demonstrate that you can have a mental state (pain) with no behavioral output or disposition whatsoever - Furthermore, the theory is logically flawed by circularity: any attempt to define a belief in terms of behavior must assume a set of desires, resulting in a definition that includes the very mental terms it sought to eliminate - While Ryle correctly identified that we often judge others' minds by their actions, he was wrong to think that this is all there is to the mind. Introspection remains an unbridgeable gap for the behaviourist