Berkeley's Idealism
Berkeley's idealism is therefore not a convincing theory of perception
- Berkeley's idealism is a theory of perception holding that the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent ideas — esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived - He is both an **idealist** (all that exists are minds and things that depend on minds) and an **immaterialist** (matter does not exist) - Berkeley supports idealism through his attack on Locke's primary/secondary quality distinction — arguing that primary qualities are just as perceptually variable as secondary ones, so both are mind-dependent — and through his Master Argument: that conceiving of an unperceived object is a contradiction, since the act of conceiving makes the object mind-dependent - Berkeley claims a strength of the theory is that it avoids scepticism: since ideas just are reality, there is no gap between perception and the world for scepticism to enter. However, as will be shown, this claimed advantage comes under serious pressure - The objections I will consider are solipsism, the argument from hallucination, and problems with the role played by God - The first two fail — solipsism because Berkeley's proof of God establishes at least one external mind; hallucination because Berkeley can distinguish veridical from non-veridical experience using God as the criterion — but the third is fatal - The problem with God's role exposes an inescapable dilemma at the foundation of the theory, and since God is the load-bearing element of Berkeley's entire system, this brings the whole structure down - Berkeley's idealism is therefore not a convincing theory of perception
Section 1: Solipsism
- The proof of God has the structure of an inference to the best explanation and is not without force — the regularity of experience does demand a causal account, and if idealism is granted, God is a natural explanation - However, it only establishes God's mind as an external mind — it says nothing about other human minds. Solipsism with respect to other persons therefore remains a live problem - There is also a structural weakness: the proof of God depends on idealism having been established by the Master Argument and attack on the P/S distinction. Both face serious objections — Russell shows the Master Argument conflates the act of conceiving with the object conceived. If those arguments fail, the proof of God has no foundation
: The argument
- Berkeley's idealism holds that all we ever perceive are mind-dependent ideas in our own mind - We perceive other people only as ideas — bundles of sensory qualities — and have no direct access to their minds - There is therefore no principled basis for believing other people have minds of their own - Idealism appears to collapse into solipsism: the view that only one's own mind and its ideas exist - This undermines Berkeley's claim that idealism is a successful epistemological theory, since it cannot ground knowledge of other persons
Berkeley: Berkeley's response
- Berkeley argues that solipsism does not follow because idealism can prove the existence of God - Ideas are passive and cannot cause other ideas; moreover we do not control all of our perceptions — we cannot will ourselves to feel pain or choose not to see what is in front of us - The cause of our ideas must therefore be external to our own mind - The complexity, order, and systematic regularity of experience is so great that only an omnipotent rational mind — God — could be responsible for it - If God exists, there is at least one entity external to our own mind, and solipsism is false
Section 2: The Argument from Hallucination
- The God-based response is effective against the basic form of the objection — by grounding the real/unreal distinction in causal origin, Berkeley recovers a principled appearance/reality distinction - However the vividness criterion is empirically vulnerable: some hallucinations are phenomenally indistinguishable from veridical perception, and the criterion fails precisely in the cases where it is most needed - The stronger epistemological version is more damaging: Berkeley cannot guarantee we can identify which of our experiences are God-caused and which are imagination-produced. The promised escape from scepticism is therefore illusory — idealism trades the indirect realist's veil of perception for an internal uncertainty between perception and hallucination
: The argument from hallucination
- P1: Berkeley's idealism holds that to be is to be perceived — reality is whatever is perceived - P2: In hallucination, a subject perceives an object that does not exist - P3: Hallucinations occur - C1: Therefore not everything perceived is real — esse est percipi is false - More deeply: if reality just is what is perceived, idealism seems to collapse the appearance/reality distinction entirely — the concept of a non-veridical experience becomes incoherent on Berkeley's own terms - **The stronger epistemological version**: even if Berkeley can explain why hallucinations occur, we still cannot always tell from the inside whether we are hallucinating or perceiving veridically. Hallucinations can be phenomenally indistinguishable from genuine perception. This means idealism cannot guarantee that our perceptions give us knowledge of reality — which was its central claimed advantage over indirect realism. The scepticism the theory was supposed to cure re-enters through the back door
Berkeley: Berkeley's response
- Hallucinations are not genuine perceptions — they are uncontrolled projections of the imagination, not ideas caused by God - God, as perfectly benevolent and non-deceptive, is the cause of all veridical ideas. He cannot be the cause of hallucinations - This preserves the appearance/reality distinction: real ideas originate from God's mind; hallucinations are corrupt products of our own imagination - Berkeley adds that hallucinations tend to be less vivid and less coherently connected to the rest of experience than veridical perceptions
Section 3: Problems with the Role Played by God
- This dilemma is logically exhaustive. The two horns are genuinely the only options and neither is available to Berkeley. Unlike the previous objections, this one cannot be deflected by appealing to God — the problem is about God himself - It is also worth noting that this is not merely a problem for theists: any idealist who requires a sustaining mind to ground the persistence of objects faces the same regress about whatever entity they invoke to play that role
: The argument
- Berkeley's entire system depends on God: God explains the persistence of objects when unobserved, grounds the appearance/reality distinction, and resolves solipsism. God is the load-bearing pillar of the theory - Sub-problem (i) — if God perceives all ideas including pain, he must experience pain, conflicting with divine impassibility. Berkeley can answer this: God has perfect propositional knowledge of pain without acquaintance knowledge of it, since as a transcendent being he has no body. This sub-problem is not decisive - Sub-problem (ii) — the deeper problem: esse est percipi generates an inescapable dilemma when applied to God himself: - **Horn 1 — apply esse est percipi to God**: God's existence depends on being perceived. But only God himself is capable of perceiving God. So God's existence is constituted by God's own perception of himself — which is viciously circular. The perceiver must already exist in order to perceive; God cannot bootstrap himself into existence through self-perception - **Horn 2 — exempt God from esse est percipi**: Berkeley admits something can exist without being perceived, i.e. mind-independently. But this is precisely what the whole theory was designed to deny. If God can exist mind-independently, the door is open for matter to exist mind-independently too — Berkeley has abandoned his central principle to save his theory
Berkeley: Berkeley has no viable response
- There is no third option: either the principle is universal or it is not - Without a coherent account of God's existence, every solution Berkeley offered collapses simultaneously — objects no longer persist when unobserved, the appearance/reality distinction dissolves, and solipsism returns
- Solipsism fails as a decisive objection: the proof of God establishes at least one external mind, and indirect realism faces a structurally similar problem anyway - The argument from hallucination fails in its basic form — the God-based distinction between veridical and non-veridical experience is coherent — but the epistemological version shows that idealism cannot fully deliver on its promised escape from scepticism - The problems with God's role succeed: sub-problem (i) is answered by the acquaintance/propositional knowledge distinction, but sub-problem (ii) presents an inescapable dilemma with no coherent exit - The collapse of God takes the solutions to both prior objections down with it — the theory's responses to solipsism and hallucination were always dependent on an incoherent foundation - Berkeley's idealism is therefore not a convincing theory of perception