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Introduction
Is Dualism a Convincing Theory of the Mind?
- Dualism holds that the mental is not reducible to the physical. Substance dualism (Descartes' version) holds that mind and body are distinct substances: res cogitans and res extensa. Property dualism holds there is only one kind of substance, physical matter, but that it possesses two distinct kinds of properties: physical and mental
- The intuition driving both is the same: there is something about conscious experience (its first-person, subjective character) that resists physical description. I will argue that the best argument for substance dualism (the conceivability argument) fails, that the best argument for property dualism (the knowledge argument) also fails, and that the causal exclusion problem then shows the irreducibility claim common to both forms to be not just unsupported but fatally flawed. Dualism is not a convincing theory of the mind