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Introduction
The Tripartite View of Knowledge
- The tripartite view of knowledge claims that S knows P if and only if: S believes P, S has justification for P, and P is true. These are proposed as individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions
- A strength of the theory is how intuitively its criteria account for what Zagzebski called knowledge's 'cognitive contact with reality': truth ensures the belief is not false, belief provides the cognitive element, and justification explains how the belief relates to its truth in a non-accidental way. A lucky guess, even if true, does not feel like knowledge, and justification seems to rule this out
- I will consider three criticisms: that the conditions are not individually necessary, that they are not jointly sufficient (Gettier), and that truth condition analysis itself is the wrong approach to defining knowledge. The first is weak. The second motivates two attempted patches (no false lemmas and reliabilism), both of which ultimately fail. This failure motivates the third and most crucial criticism: that truth condition analysis is structurally doomed. I will argue that virtue epistemology offers a more convincing account of knowledge than any truth-conditional theory