Does the Existence of Evil Disprove the Existence of God?
The existence of evil does not conclusively disprove God's existence, but the Evidential Problem of Evil succeeds in showing that belief in God is not justified on the evidence available.
- The problem of evil argues that the existence of evil is incompatible with the existence of the God of classical theism — defined as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent - I will consider two versions: the logical problem of evil, which claims God and evil cannot logically coexist, and the evidential problem, which claims that the evil we observe constitutes evidence against God's existence - Against the logical problem, Plantinga's free will defence largely succeeds. Against the evidential problem, Hick's soul-making theodicy initially appears promising but is ultimately undermined by its own reliance on epistemic distance, which renders it unfalsifiable and therefore evidentially inert - I will conclude that the existence of evil does not conclusively disprove God's existence, but that the evidential problem succeeds in showing that belief in God is not justified on the evidence available
Section 1: The Logical Problem of Evil and Plantinga's Free Will Defence
- Mackie's compatibilist attack has genuine philosophical force — the incoherence objection to libertarian free will is taken seriously in philosophy of mind and the compatibilist account is widely defended - However Plantinga only needs to show that God and evil can logically coexist — he does not need to show that libertarian free will is definitely the correct account, only that it is a logically coherent possibility. This is a lower bar than Mackie requires him to clear, and it is not obvious that libertarian free will is logically impossible — merely that it is philosophically contested - The free will defence therefore succeeds against the logical problem — it establishes that God and evil can logically coexist, which is all Plantinga set out to show
Mackie: Mackie's Logical problem of evil
- Mackie argues that the existence of evil is logically inconsistent with the existence of the God of classical theism. An omnipotent God has the power to eliminate evil; an omnibenevolent God has the motivation to eliminate evil; yet evil exists. These three claims cannot all be true simultaneously — so God does not exist. Formally: - P1. If God is omnipotent then he has the power to eliminate evil - P2. If God is omnibenevolent then he has the motivation to eliminate evil - P3. Evil exists - C. Therefore God does not exist
Plantinga: Plantinga's free will defence
- Plantinga argues that P2 is false — an omnibenevolent God could have good reasons for permitting evil, specifically the value of free will - It is logically possible that all evil results from the abuse of free will: moral evil from human free choices, natural evil from the free choices of supernatural beings such as Satan. Free will is so valuable that a world with free will and evil is better than a world without either — an omnibenevolent God would therefore permit evil for the sake of free will - Mackie objects that a world where free creatures always choose good is logically possible, so God should have created it. - Plantinga responds that to make free creatures always choose good would contradict the very meaning of free choice. God can only do the logically possible, and 'making' someone 'freely choose' good is a contradiction in terms
Mackie: Mackie's compatibilist counter
- Mackie attacks the conception of free will that Plantinga's defence depends on. There are two competing definitions, and which one you accept determines whether the free will defence works - **Libertarian free will** (what Plantinga needs) claims that a truly free choice is one where you could genuinely have done otherwise — your choice is not fully determined by anything. Mackie argues this is incoherent, because every choice must have some cause: if caused by your character, it was determined; if caused by external circumstances, it was determined; if it has no cause at all, it is merely random — which is not freedom either. There is no other option for libertarian freedom to occupy. - **Compatibilist free will** (what Mackie proposes instead): freedom and causal determination are compatible. A free choice is simply one caused by your own character and desires without external coercion — you are only unfree when something outside you forces your hand - On the compatibilist definition, God could have created humans with perfectly good characters, from which only good choices would flow. Those people would still be free in the only coherent sense. Such creatures do not exist — so God does not exist
Section 2: The Evidential Problem and Hick's Soul-Making Theodicy
- Soul-making is evidentially the most serious theodicy available. Its compatibility with Darwin and the genuine evidence that hardship builds character give it more support than purely logical defences - However Rowe's dysteleological evil objection is powerful — the burning fawn is a vivid illustration of evil that appears to serve no soul-making purpose whatsoever, and the distribution and quantity of evil in the world does not look like the product of a perfectly calibrated soul-making process - Soul-making therefore faces a serious evidential challenge it cannot straightforwardly answer — which is what motivates Hick's appeal to epistemic distance
: The evidential problem of Evil
- The evidential problem is a posteriori and inductive — it does not claim God and evil are logically incompatible, only that the evil we observe is evidence against God's existence. Unlike the logical problem, it does not require the impossibility of God's coexistence with evil — only that evil makes God's existence evidentially unjustified. Formally: - P1. We are only justified in believing what the evidence supports - P2. The evidence we observe is of a world containing apparently random and gratuitous evil — not a world governed by a perfect being - C. Belief in an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God is not justified by the evidence - This is a stronger argument than the logical problem precisely because it sets a more modest bar. The atheist need not show God's existence is impossible — only that the evidence does not support it, and that seems to be enough to make God's existence unconvincing.
Hick: Hick's soul-making theodicy
- A theodicy responding to the evidential problem must do more than show logical compatibility — it must be evidentially supported. Hick's soul-making theodicy attempts this - Unlike Augustine, who requires a literal Fall from a perfect created state, Hick draws on Irenaeus and argues that humans were created imperfect in an imperfect world, with the capacity for moral and spiritual development. God allows evil because it is necessary for soul-making — the development of virtue and character - Courage cannot develop without danger; compassion cannot develop without suffering. A world without evil would make genuine virtues impossible to have. Crucially, soul-making fits with Darwin's account of our origins — we were not created perfect and fell, but evolved gradually in a world of struggle. This gives the theodicy genuine evidential plausibility that purely logical defences lack - There is real evidence that hardship builds character and virtue — this is behind the idea of character development across literature and human experience. Soul-making therefore meets the evidential burden to a degree
Rowe: Rowe's dysteleological evil objection
- Rowe argues that much evil appears to serve no soul-making purpose whatsoever — dysteleological evil. His vivid example given to show this is a fawn trapped and burned in a forest fire, lying in agony for days before dying unobserved. No human witnesses it, arguably no soul-making can result from it - Although God may have reasons to allow some kinds of suffering in the world, it is very hard to see what reason he could have for allowing the suffering just described. - So it is probable that there is no reason why an omnipotent, omnibenevolent God would allow suffering of this kind, meaning that the existence of such evil makes it probable that such a God does not exist
Section 3: Epistemic Distance and the Unfalsifiability Objection
- The unfalsifiability objection is not merely a technical point — it goes to the heart of what a theodicy responding to the evidential problem must achieve. If Hick cannot in principle provide evidence for soul-making, he has not discharged the evidential burden; he has simply made his position immune to scrutiny - This is philosophically more damaging than Rowe's dysteleological evil objection alone, because it shows that Hick's entire evidential strategy self-destructs rather than merely failing on specific cases - It is worth being precise about what this does and does not show: it does not prove that God does not exist, or that evil makes God's existence logically impossible. It shows that belief in God is not justified on the evidence available — which is precisely and only what the evidential problem claimed
Hick: Hick's epistemic distance
- To answer Rowe's objection, Hick appeals to epistemic distance. If God made his existence and purposes obvious, we would simply obey out of fear rather than genuinely developing virtue through free choice. God must therefore maintain epistemic distance — withdrawing from the world so that evil appears random and his purposes are not transparent - This explains dysteleological evil directly: if every instance of suffering were perfectly calibrated to the soul-making needs of those who experienced it, God's existence and purposes would become obvious, destroying epistemic distance and undermining soul-making entirely. Apparently random, disproportionate, and dysteleological evil is therefore not a problem for the theodicy — it is a necessary feature of it
: The unfalsifiability objection
- But this move is self-defeating in a precise and devastating way. Hick is conceding that evil does not appear to be geared towards soul-making — and then insisting that is exactly how it must appear for the theodicy to work. Epistemic distance is therefore available as a response to any instance of evil whatsoever: no matter how pointless, disproportionate, or soul-breaking an instance of evil appears, Hick can always say that is how it must appear for epistemic distance to be maintained - This means soul-making theodicy is unfalsifiable — there is no possible evidence that could count against it. But an unfalsifiable claim cannot serve as evidence for anything either. Hick cannot simultaneously use soul-making as evidence that God has good reasons for allowing evil, and insulate it from all possible counter-evidence - There is no observable difference between a world where a perfect God allows apparently random evil for soul-making purposes, and a world where evil is random because there is no God. No evidence could help us decide which world we are in
: Why this is fatal
- The evidential problem only requires that we are not justified in believing in God on the evidence available. A theodicy responding to it must be evidentially supported — that is the burden it must discharge - Soul-making initially appeared to meet this burden through its compatibility with Darwin and the evidence that hardship builds character. But epistemic distance removes soul-making from the domain of evidence entirely. Hick has not answered the evidential problem — he has restated it in theological language - We are therefore left precisely where Hume's evidential problem placed us: with a world of apparently random evil and no evidential basis for inferring a perfect God behind it
- The logical problem of evil fails: Plantinga's free will defence shows it is at least logically possible that God permits evil for the sake of free will. Mackie's compatibilist counter is serious but requires showing libertarian free will is logically impossible — a higher bar than merely showing it is philosophically contested - The evidential problem is more serious and initially appears answerable: Hick's soul-making theodicy has genuine evidential support through its compatibility with Darwin and the evidence that hardship builds character. But Rowe's dysteleological evil objection exposes a real weakness - Hick's response — epistemic distance — saves soul-making from Rowe but at a fatal cost: it renders the theodicy unfalsifiable. There is no observable difference between a soul-making world and a godless one. An unfalsifiable theodicy cannot discharge an evidential burden - The existence of evil does not disprove God's existence — Plantinga is right that logical coexistence is possible. But the evidential problem succeeds: belief in God is not justified on the evidence available, since the only theodicy capable of addressing the evidential burden removes itself from evidential consideration entirely in doing so