Does the Ontological Argument Prove That God Exists?
I will conclude that the ontological argument fails to prove that God exists — at most it proves that if God exists, he exists with a special kind of metaphysical necessity, which Hick calls ontological necessity. But this falls short of proving actual existence
- The ontological argument is an a priori deductive argument which aims to prove God's existence purely through reflection on the concept of God — without any appeal to experience or empirical evidence - Anselm argues that God, as the greatest conceivable being, must exist in reality as well as in the mind, since a being that existed only in the mind would be lesser than one that also existed in reality. Descartes develops this by arguing that existence is a perfection which belongs to the essence of a supremely perfect being — just as three-sidedness belongs to the essence of a triangle - I will consider three objections: Kant's objection that existence is not a predicate, Gaunilo's perfect island objection, and Kant's deeper objection that even if existence is a predicate the argument only establishes a conditional claim. The third is the most crucial - I will conclude that the ontological argument fails to prove that God exists — at most it proves that if God exists, he exists with a special kind of metaphysical necessity, which Hick calls ontological necessity. But this falls short of proving actual existence
Section 1: Kant's Objection That Existence Is Not a Predicate
- Kant's objection is powerful and the 100 thalers example is vivid. It does seem right that 'exists' functions differently from genuine predicates like 'wise' or 'powerful' — it does not describe what a thing is like but merely asserts that there is such a thing - However Descartes' intuition point has some force — there does seem to be something to the idea that existence is inseparable from the concept of a supremely perfect being in a way it is not inseparable from the concept of a cat or a coin. The triangle analogy captures this intuition well, and there is in fact a distinction to be made here - It might be argued that Kant is only correct about contingent existence. - The reason for the existence of a contingent thing is dependence on something else, so is external and not a defining part of it. - However a necessary being contains the reason for its existence within itself. So, necessary existence is a defining quality of a thing, in a way contingent existence is not. So necessary existence is a predicate. - Hence a deeper problem for Kant's objection at this stage is that it works well against Anselms' version but less well against Malcolm's modal version, which does not claim that existence is a perfection but rather that necessary existence is. Kant's objection therefore does not conclusively show that the ontological argument fails
Kant: Kant's objection — existence is not a predicate
- The ontological argument claims that denying God's existence is an incoherent denial of what God is, i.e., the greatest or supremely perfect being - Kant responds that this misunderstands what existence is. It treats 'existence' like a predicate, a description of what a thing is - If I say 'the cat exists', the term 'exists' doesn't describe a quality that the cat possesses. It describes that the cat exists, but not the cat itself - Kant gave the example of 100 thalers (coins) existing in reality compared to their existing only in the mind. If existence were a predicate, it would add to the concept of the existing coins. The existing coins would then be conceptually different to the coins in the mind. But they are not. 100 coins is just 100 coins, defined by the predicates of 100, round, shiny, etc. - So, existence is not a predicate - This criticism attacks Anselm's premise 2 that existing is greater than not existing. If existence is not a predicate, then existing cannot be greater than not existing as there is not actually a distinction to be made in the concept - So, existence is not part of what God is, which means we can deny God's existence without contradicting what God is
Descartes: Descartes' response — the rejection of the use of Aristotelian logic
- Descartes rejected the Aristotelian logic of subject-predicate analysis. He does not try to deduce God's existence through assigning predicates to the concept of God - He claims that God's existence can be known through rational intuition, our mind's ability to grasp truths without a process of reasoning or inference - He illustrates with a triangle. We are unable to clearly and distinctly conceive of a triangle while separating it from having three sides. So we can know through intuition that a triangle must have three sides - Similarly, when we conceive of a supremely perfect being, we are unable to separate it from existence - Descartes concludes we can intuitively know that God exists
: Response to Descartes
- Descartes presents a strong argument because he uses a great example - However Descartes is confused. The difference between the triangle and God is that having three sides is part of the concept of a triangle, whilst existence adds nothing to the concept of God - Descartes argues that existence is part of God's essence, however existence cannot be part of something's essence just as it cannot be part of something's concept. Kant illustrates this with his example of 100 thalers - Though Descartes cannot be right that existence is part of God's essence, his point does intuitively seem to have weight - This intuition seems justified in that it might be argued that Kant is correct, but only about contingent existence - The reason for the existence of a contingent thing is dependence on something else, so is external and not a defining part of it - However a necessary being contains the reason for its existence within itself. So, necessary existence is a defining quality of a thing, in a way contingent existence is not. So necessary existence is a predicate
Section 2: Malcolm's Modal Argument and Gaunilo's Objection
- Gaunilo's objection does not distinguish between contingent and necessary existence, which is its fatal flaw. An island is by definition contingent — it is a piece of land surrounded by water, and its existence depends on the existence of water, land, and geological processes. Contingent things cannot exist necessarily, so the logic of Malcolm's argument simply cannot apply to islands - If we try to imagine an island defined as existing necessarily, we run into a contradiction: either the island's existence depends on nothing (making it unlimited and infinite) in which case it is no longer an island in any recognisable sense, or it becomes indistinguishable from God himself. So there is a principled relevant difference between God and islands that explains why the argument applies to one and not the other - However Gaunilo's underlying intuition — that there is a gap between what is necessary in our conceptual judgements and what is necessary in reality — is actually correct. It just needs to be developed more carefully, which is what Kant's deeper objection in Point 3 does
Malcolm: Malcolm's argument
- Malcolm argues that the key move should be from existence to necessary existence. A being whose existence is necessary — who cannot fail to exist — is more perfect than one whose existence is merely contingent - God as an unlimited, infinite being cannot have come into existence (that would require a cause, making him dependent and limited) and cannot go out of existence (that would require a cause or happen by chance, again making him limited) - Therefore if God exists, his existence is necessary; and if God does not exist, his existence is impossible — there is no middle ground of contingent existence for God - Since there is no contradiction in the concept of God, his existence cannot be impossible — therefore it must be necessary, and God must exist - Formally: - P1: Either God exists or he doesn't - P2: If God does not exist, his existence is impossible - P3: If God does exist, his existence is necessary - P4: So God's existence is either impossible or necessary - P5: There is no contradiction in the idea of God - C: So God's existence is necessary — God must exist - This version avoids Kant's first objection: necessary existence does seem to add something to our concept of a thing. The concept of 100 thalers that exist necessarily is different from the concept of 100 thalers — necessary existence is a genuine predicate unlike bare existence
Gaunilo: Gaunilo's perfect island objection
- Gaunilo argues that the ontological argument's logic is absurd because it could be applied to anything to prove the existence of a greatest possible version of that thing - Gaunilo uses the example of an island, the greatest possible island (GPI). - Malcom's argument can be presented in the same way, but with the GPI replacing God: - P1: Either the GPI exists or it doesn't - P2: If the GPI does not exist, its existence is impossible - P3: If the GPI does exist, its existence is necessary - P4: So the GPI's existence is either impossible or necessary - P5: There is no contradiction in the idea of the GPI - C: So the GPI's existence is necessary — the GPI must exist - Gaunilo is not attacking a specific premise but arguing that the argument's logical form leads to ridiculous conclusions, so something must be wrong with it.
Section 3: Kant's Conditional Objection and Hick's Development
- Hick's distinction is genuinely illuminating. It explains why the ontological argument has such an impact — there does seem to be something right about the idea that God, if he exists, would exist in a metaphysically special way unlike ordinary contingent things. The argument captures something true about what God's existence would be like. But it cannot bridge the gap between what God's existence would be like and whether God actually exists - Malcolm cannot escape by simply insisting that necessary existence entails actual existence — that move only works if the necessity is logical, and Hick has shown it is only ontological. A sheer fact of God's non-existence is uncomfortable but not contradictory - The conclusion Hick points us towards is precise: the ontological argument succeeds in showing that if God exists, he exists with ontological necessity — as a self-explaining, eternal, non-contingent being. This is philosophically interesting and not nothing. But it falls well short of proving that God actually exists
Kant: Kant's conditional objection
- Even granting that necessary existence is a genuine predicate — even granting Malcolm everything so far — Kant argues the argument still fails - Consider Descartes' triangle example: it is necessarily true that if a triangle exists it has three sides. But this does not prove that triangles exist — it only tells us what triangles would be like if they existed - The same applies to God. Even if necessary existence is part of God's concept, this only tells us what God would be like if he existed — namely, that he would exist necessarily. It does not establish that God actually exists - Put simply: a necessary connection between the concept of God and the concept of existence only tells us about concepts, not about reality. We cannot move from conceptual analysis alone to a conclusion about what actually exists
Malcolm: Malcolm's response
- Malcolm argues that Kant's objection is incoherent when applied to a necessary being. To accept that God is a necessary being and yet deny that he exists seems contradictory — how can a being whose very nature is to exist necessarily fail to exist? - If we accept that necessary existence is genuinely part of God's nature, it seems we cannot coherently say God does not exist
Hick: Hick's development — ontological vs logical necessity
- This is where Hick makes a crucial and subtle distinction that goes beyond Kant's point and directly addresses Malcolm's response - Malcolm's reply assumes that if necessary existence is part of God's nature, then God's non-existence would be a logical contradiction — as impossible as a four-sided triangle - Hick argues that Malcolm is conflating two importantly different kinds of necessity: - **Logical necessity**: something whose non-existence would be a logical contradiction. A triangle without three sides is logically impossible — it contradicts the definition of a triangle. If God's existence were logically necessary in this sense, then atheism would be as incoherent as claiming triangles have four sides - **Ontological necessity** (Hick's term): something that is eternal, self-explaining, non-contingent, and not dependent on anything else for its existence — what theologians call aseity. This is a metaphysical claim about the kind of being God would be, not a claim about logical impossibility - Hick's point is that Malcolm's argument only establishes ontological necessity — that God, if he exists, would be a self-explaining, non-contingent, eternal being who does not depend on anything else. This is genuinely different from saying God's non-existence is logically contradictory - A world without God is not logically impossible in the way a four-sided triangle is. God's non-existence would simply be what Hick calls a **'sheer fact'** — an unexplained brute fact, but not a logical contradiction - So Malcolm is wrong to say it is incoherent to accept necessary existence as part of God's nature while denying God exists. We can consistently say: if God existed he would exist with ontological necessity — as an eternal, self-explaining being — but there is no God, and that is simply an unexplained fact about reality
- Kant's first objection — that existence is not a predicate — has genuine force against Descartes but is avoided by Malcolm's modal version, which substitutes necessary existence for bare existence. It is therefore not conclusive - Gaunilo's perfect island objection gestures at something important but fails against Malcolm because islands are contingently defined and cannot exist necessarily. Its significance lies in the intuition it points towards rather than the argument as stated - Kant's conditional objection is more fundamental: even granting that necessary existence is a genuine predicate, conceptual analysis can only tell us what God would be like if he existed, not that he does exist. Hick sharpens this crucially — Malcolm's response that it is incoherent to accept necessary existence while denying God exists only works if the necessity is logical. But what Malcolm has established is ontological necessity — that God would be eternal, self-explaining, and non-contingent. A world without such a being would be a brute unexplained fact, but not a logical contradiction - The ontological argument therefore fails to prove that God exists. At most it establishes that if God exists, he exists with ontological necessity — as a being of a metaphysically special kind. That is philosophically interesting, but it is not proof of existence